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The Stability and Growth Pact (henceforth SGP) with its budget rules repre-
sents a sort of ex-post ￿scal coordination mechanism for EMU countries, where
there is the "cohabitation" of one independent monetary policy and many ￿scal
policies. The aim of these ￿scal rules is to stabilize Public Debt with respect
to GDP, through the control of de￿cit with respect to GDP, both in the short
term and in the medium term. In words, the SGP is founded on the idea that
excessive de￿cits and high debts with respect to GDP are able to destroy the
economic architecture of the EMU.
A large part of the literature (Buti et al. (1997), Melitz (2000), Wyplosz
(2002), Gal￿ and Perotti (2003)) has developed di⁄erent works to understand
whether the SGP has tied the EMU members￿hands in pursuing the stabiliza-
tion of the business cycles through the instruments of ￿scal policy (i.e. taxation
and public expenditure). Nevertheless, evidence is not univocal and covers a
very short time span (at the most ten years) for the construction of a represen-
tative sample in the EMU that incorporates di⁄erent scenarios for the business
cycle and the application of ￿scal policy instruments to it.
Buti et al. (1997) underline an excessive procyclicality for ￿scal policy
in EMU countries during and after severe recessions in the period 1961-1996;
Melitz (2000) ￿nds strong evidence of stabilization for the ratio Debt/GDP in
EMU countries, but ￿nds a weaker stabilizing movement for public expenditures;
Wyplosz (2002) ￿nds evidence for Italy, France and Germany of a countercycli-
cality in public consumption and an acyclicality (Italy) or procyclicality (France
and Germany) for tax revenues. Anyway for the years 1992-20011 he ￿nds some
evidence of an asymmetric behavior of ￿scal policy components: in France there
is a countercyclical reaction to downswings and a procyclical reaction to up-
swings; in Italy, public expenditure is more countercyclical and taxation more
procyclical during downswings. The study of the sub-sample 1992-2001 has
been driven by a key question of a large part of literature: have the Maastricht
convergence criteria and the SGP requirements weakened the stabilizing role of
￿scal policy in EMU countries? An attempt to answer this question, supported
by a detailed empirical analysis, is given by Gal￿ and Perotti (2003), who point
out that ￿scal policy in the EMU has become more countercyclical over time,
following what appears to be a trend that a⁄ects other industrialized EMU and
non-EMU countries as well; therefore, the SGP constraints would not represent
an impediment on a stabilization path. Moreover, the decline in public invest-
ment, observed in the recent data, seems to follow a common tendency in other
countries and starts before the implementation of the SGP. However, as Gal￿
and Perotti state, real recessions in the period after-Maastricht have been quite
rare and hence the available data are not so binding to announce a "failure" in
the stabilizing activity of ￿scal policy.
The goal of this paper is to evaluate, within a DSGE model, the performances
of two ￿scal rules, the former on public expenditure and the latter on taxation,
1The global sample covers the period 1971-2001.
2and one monetary rule, i.e. a Taylor rule increased by a stochastic component
driven by a monetary shock. Public expenditure follows a countercyclical and
debt-stabilizing rule, whereas taxation is given by the sum of tax revenues com-
ing from distortionary taxation on labor, on dividends and interests on public
bonds issued by the government to ￿nance its stock of debt. In this way, pub-
lic expenditure pursues both the objectives of debt stabilization, as implicitly
required by the SGP from ￿scal policy, and business cycle stabilization, that is
one of the purposes assigned to ￿scal policy (Musgrave (1959))2.
Our analysis makes use of a microfounded theoretical New-Keynesian model
with sticky prices ￿ la Calvo (1983) applied to a currency union, following a large
body of literature (Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Ferrero (2005), Gal￿ and Mona-
celli (2008), Colciago et al. (2008) among others), and a welfare loss function for
each country belonging to the currency union to compute the consumers￿losses
in the presence of monetary and ￿scal rules. This approach has been imple-
mented by much literature for monetary policy rules (Rotember and Woodford
(1999) and Gal￿ (2008) among others), relying on a second-order approximation
to the utility losses of the households caused by deviations of variables from their
e¢ cient allocation values. Also Ferrero (2005) uses a welfare-based approach to
evaluate the desiderability of ￿scal and monetary rules in a currency union, his
analysis di⁄ers from ours essentially for the presence of a rule on real stock of
public debt instead of a rule on public consumption as we do and for the use
of a di⁄erent welfare loss function. Indeed, Ferrero (2005) uses Benigno and
Woodford￿ s (2005) welfare loss function, that is able to take into account the
presence of distortionary taxation and a positive stock of debt with correspond-
ing steady state values di⁄erent from the ones of the Central Planner￿ s solution.
The welfare loss function adopted in this paper, instead, has the same structure
as the one of Gal￿ and Monacelli (2008)3: the arguments of this function are the
squared domestic in￿ ation, the squared output gap and the squared ￿scal gap4.
The benchmark value of these variables against which we measure the losses is
represented by a fully ￿ exible prices equilibrium with lump-sum taxation able
to ￿nance public consumption, whose optimal behavior is described in the Ap-
pendix, in the absence of public debt and any rules on monetary policy. In such
a framework the fully ￿ exible prices equilibrium calculated as the solution of
2This theory designs three purposes for ￿scal policy and it also does the same for public
expenditure: the provision for social goods, i.e. the allocation function of budget policy; the
distribution of wealth among the citizens to equalize the incomes, i.e. the distribution function
and the business cycle stabilization, i.e. the stabilization function.
3Gal￿ and Monacelli (2008) show that, in the presence of sticky prices, the combined
monetary-￿scal policy mix able to maximize the average welfare of union households must
lead at the union level to a constant (zero) value both for the output gap, in￿ation and ￿scal
gap. Anyway, the same authors argue that the union-wide equilibrium in general cannot be
an equilibrium under the optimal policy for each member country: in this case the second-
best allocation of the in￿ation gap and the output gap will have a non trivial equilibrium
dynamics as for the union level. This equilibrium dynamics can be described through a series
of dynamics simulations, given an appropriate calibration for the model parameters.
4Fiscal gap is de￿ned as the share of output used for public consumption less the amount
of public expenditure to which the households give a weight in the utility function.
3the Social Planner￿ s problem is also supported at a decentralized level5.
In particular, we compare three di⁄erent scenarios: in the ￿rst one there is
the only presence of our monetary rule with lump-sum taxation able to ￿nance
public consumption at its optimal level, and in the absence of public debt; in
the second scenario there are only ￿scal rules and no monetary policy rules,
whereas in the third scenario both ￿scal and monetary rules are present.
Here is an overview of the results:
￿ the presence of only our monetary rule is able to generate a stronger
decrease in domestic in￿ ation variance than the presence of ￿scal rules
only;
￿ the presence of our ￿scal rules generates an output gap smoothing stronger
than our monetary rule alone;
￿ the combination of monetary and ￿scal rules generates less welfare losses
than the rules considered in isolation.
Hence, in the EMU the attainment of price stability should depend on the
common monetary policy, whereas ￿scal policy, institutionally decentralized at
a country level, should be focused on output gap stabilization, that, in turn, can
be also reached in the presence of rules that ensure countercyclicality to ￿scal
policy, together with debt stabilization, as required by the SGP.
The paper is organized as follows. The model structure and its properties
are set out in section 2. In Section 3, we derive the equilibrium market clearing
conditions for the demand side of the market and for the supply side; in section
4, we discuss the calibration of the model parameters, whereas in section 5 we
analyse, through the impulse response functions, the results coming from the
time series generated by the model both in the presence of a technology shock
and a union-wide interest rate shock. In section 6, we conclude.
2 A Currency Union Model for Fiscal Policy
We develop a closed currency union model, in the spirit of Gal￿ and Monacelli
(2008), made up of a continuum of small open economies, represented by the
unit interval, such as the domestic policy decisions do not have any e⁄ect on
the rest of the union.
We consider such a framework suitable to give a realistic description of the
inner structure of a monetary union like the EMU, made up of ￿fteen members
(each one with an independent ￿scal authority). In fact and in line with a small
country model, EMU countries are small relative to the union as a whole. Hence,
each country￿ s policy decisions have very little impact on the other countries;
this context, as a matter of principle, could be described by widening the existing
one to incorporate ￿fteen countries, but such undertaking would render the
resulting model intractable.
5The analytical conditions are reported in the Appendix.
4In this model, each country has identical preferences, technology and market
structure; three agents are considered within each economy: the households, the
￿rms and the government.
2.1 Households
All households living in the representative country i belonging to the monetary
union aim to maximize an utility function de￿ned over private consumption,
Ci
t; hours of work, Ni
t and public expenditure Gi
t:
E0
1 X
t=0
￿tU
￿
Ci
t;Ni
t;Gi
t
￿
(1)
The consumption index Ci
t is de￿ned as the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator over
the bundles of goods produced in country i and f respectively:
Ci
t =
￿
Ci
i;t
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Ci
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￿m
(1 ￿ m)
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where Ci
i;t is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator de￿ned over the continuum of di⁄erenti-
ated goods produced in country i and j ￿[0;1] denotes the type of good (within
the set produced in country i). Each lot of goods is produced by a separate ￿rm
and no goods are produced in more than one country:
Ci
i;t =
￿Z 1
0
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(3)
The aggregator Ci
F;t;in turn, is an index of country i￿ s consumption of imported
goods and represents an exogenous variable for country i:
Ci
F;t = exp
Z 1
0
ci
f;tdf
where ci
f;t
6 = logCf;t is the log of an index of the goods consumed by
country i￿ s households that are produced in country f: This index is de￿ned
symmetrically to (3):
Ci
f;t =
￿Z 1
0
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f;t (j)
￿￿1
￿ dj
￿ ￿
￿￿1
Note that in the speci￿cation of composite consumption index above, m
￿[0;1] is the weight of imported goods in the utility of private consumption; we
can think at m as an index of openness. The parameter ￿ > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution across goods produced within one country.
6In what follows, all the variables in small letters indicate the logarithms of the correspon-
dent variables in capital letters.
5The utility function takes the following form, following Gal￿ and Monacelli
(2008):
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where parameter ￿ ￿[0;1) represents the preference for public consumption
Gi
t.
All the prices are set in the common numeraire. The law of one price is
assumed to hold, so that the price of each variety of goods is the same across
countries. The implied overall consumption-based price index is:
Pi
c;t =
￿
Pi
t
￿1￿m
(P￿
t )
m (5)
where Pi
t =
￿R 1
0 Pi
t(j)1￿￿dj
￿ 1
1￿￿
represents country i￿ s domestic price in-
dex (i.e., an index of prices of domestically produced goods), for all i￿[0;1] and
P￿
t = exp
R 1
0 p
f
t df is the union-wide price index, that from the viewpoint of
any individual country can be seen as the price index for imported goods. Sym-
metrically, the price index for the basket of goods imported from country f is
de￿ned as P
f
t =
￿R 1
0 P
f
t (j)1￿￿dj
￿ 1
1￿￿
. Note that the elasticities of domestic
price index and union-wide price index de￿ned in (5) correspond to the relative
weights of the respective goods in the consumption basket.
The maximization of (1) is subject to the following sequence of budget con-
straints:
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where Pi
t(j) is the price of the domestic goods (expressed in units of the single
currency) and P
f
t (j) is the price of the imported goods. Bi
i;t is the nominal value
net from interest rate taxation in period t of a bond issued by the government
of country i in period t and purchased by the citizens of country i, Bi
f;t is the
nominal value net from interest rate taxation in period t of a bond issued by the
government of country f in period t and purchased by the citizens of country i:
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where Di
t
￿
D
f
t
￿
is the nominal stock of public debt issued by the Government
of country i(f) and whose law of motion is discussed later, r￿
t is the nominal
interest rate for the currency union, that follows a Taylor rule as explained in
the next section, the fraction #(1 ￿ #) is the share of foreign (domestic) debt
purchased by the households of country i. ￿i
i;t is the nominal dividend in period
6t for a share7 of a domestic ￿rm purchased in t by the domestic households,
whereas ￿i
f;tis the nominal dividend in period t for a share of a foreign ￿rm
purchased in t by the domestic inhabitants:
￿i
i;t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿k)￿i
t (7)
￿i
f;t+1 = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿k)￿
f
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where ￿i
t
￿
￿
f
t
￿
is the nominal pro￿t of the representative ￿rm of country i(f),
the fraction ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) is the share of domestic (foreign) ￿rm held by each inhabi-
tant of country i. ￿i
t denotes lump-sum taxes, whose role will be discussed later.
Wi
t is the nominal wage, ￿n is a distortionary wage tax levied by the government
on labor and ￿k is a distortionary tax levied by the government on the income
coming both from dividends and bonds, that are the ￿nancial assets of the rep-
resentative consumer. Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one-period
ahead nominal values of each ￿nancial asset: it is common across countries. For
each country, household￿ s consumption must be optimally allocated across all
di⁄erentiated goods: expenditure on goods j is negatively related to the relative
price of goods j and it satis￿es the following ￿rst-order conditions:
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i;t(j) =
￿
Pi
t(j)
Pi
t
￿￿￿
Ci
i;t;Ci
f;t(j) =
 
P
f
t (j)
P
f
t
!￿￿
Ci
f;t (9)
for all i;f;j ￿[0;1]. it follows from the previous relationship that
R 1
0 Pi
t(j)Ci
i;t(j)dj =
Pi
tCi
i;t and
R 1
0 P
f
t (j)Ci
f;t(j)dj = P
f
t Ci
f;t:
For country f symmetric conditions hold as for country i; in particular, the
consumer price index (CPI) is thus obtained:
P
f
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￿
P
f
t
￿1￿m
(P￿
t )
m (10)
if we log-linearize and integrate both the members of the previous relation-
ship over f￿[0;1], we obtain the equality (11):
p￿
c;t = p￿
t (11)
Moreover, the optimal allocation of expenditures for imported goods by
country of origin implies:
P
f
t Ci
f;t = P￿
t Ci
F;t (12)
for all f ￿[0;1]:
Finally, combining all the previuos results, we can express respectively the
optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and imported goods in
7In what follows, we suppose that the value of the shares held is given only by the value of
the dividends; the initial value of each share is zero and there is not any form of capital gain.
7country i and the total consumption expenditures by country i￿ s households in
the following way:
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Hence, the period budget constraint can be rewritten in a more compact
way as:
Pi
c;tCi
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where Fi
t is a portfolio that collects all the ￿nancial assets purchased by the
domestic households.
The remaining optimality condition for the control variables (Ci
t;Ni
t) for the
households are given by:
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For each household, the optimality condition for the allocation of wealth
among the ￿nancial assets characterizes the stochastic discount factor as:
￿
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!)
= Qt;t+1 (17)
if we take the expected value on both the members of (20), we obtain the
standard form of the Euler equation:
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where R￿
t+1 = 1
EtfQt;t+1g is the gross nominal interest rate.
The assumption of complete markets for the ￿nancial assets across the union
implies for country f an Euler equation analogous to (21):
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Combining (18) and (19), we obtain:
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where ￿i =
P
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c;t+1C
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is a constant which depends on initial conditions re-
garding relative net asset positions: if we suppose zero net foreign asset holdings
8for all countries together with the hypothesis of an ex-ante identical environ-
ment, we have the case in which ￿i = ￿ = 1 for all i￿[0;1], i.e.:
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f
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Moreover, in each country government￿ s assets are also subject to the fol-
lowing transversality condition:
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In the next subsection, we describe the behavior of the central bank, that
determines the monetary policy for the currency area, using the short-term
nominal interest rate as its main instrument, but, before this step, we de￿ne the
domestic CPI gross rate of in￿ ation and the union-wide gross rate of in￿ ation,
respectively as:
￿i
c;t =
Pi
c;t
Pi
c;t￿1
(24)
￿￿
t =
P￿
t
P￿
t￿1
(25)
2.2 Interest rate and monetary policy
The Central bank sets the short-term nominal interest rate r￿
t for the currency
union as a linear function of the the union-wide current in￿ ation ￿￿
t and the
union-wide output gap, de￿ned here as the deviation of output y￿
t from its level
under fully ￿ exible price value y￿n
t (Taylor rule). it is typically assumed that the
coe¢ cient on in￿ ation ￿￿ is greater than one8, which implies that the central
bank raises the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one in response to an
increase in in￿ ation:
r￿
t = ￿ r￿ + ￿￿ (￿￿
t) + ￿y (y￿
t ￿ y￿n
t ) + $t (26)
The quantity $t is an exogenous stochastic component, which follows the
following omoschedastic white-noise process:
$t = ￿$$t￿1 + "￿
$t
we can think of "￿
$t as a monetary shock, whereas ￿ r￿is the steady-state level of
long-term real interest rate, that can be derived from the Euler equation (21):
[￿ (1 + ￿ r￿)] = 1 (27)
￿ r￿ = 1 ￿
1
￿
(28)
8This condition is in line with the ￿ndings of Bullard and Mitra (2001) and satis￿es the so
called "Taylor principle".
92.3 Firms
Each country has a continuum of ￿rms represented by the interval j ￿[0;1]. Each
￿rm produces di⁄erentiated goods with a linear technology:
Y i
t (j) = Ai
tNi
t(j) (29)
where Ai
t is a country-speci￿c aggregate technology index, whose law of
motion follows an AR(1) process (in logs):
ai
t = ￿aai
t￿1 + "i
at (30)
and ￿a f0;1g: Moreover, we suppose that the stochastic process, that gener-
ates labor productivity is an omoschedastic white noise and it￿ s assumed a null
correlation between the monetary shock and the technology shock.
The assumption of a linear technology implies that real marginal costs are
given by:
mci
t = log
￿
1 ￿ si￿
+ wi
t ￿ pi
t ￿ ai
t
where si is a constant empolyment subsidy with the role to o⁄set ￿rms￿
market power represented by the monopolistic competition. This subsidy is
completely ￿nanced by the lump-sum taxes ￿i
t as in the model of Gal￿ and
Monacelli (2008).
We assume a staggered price setting ￿ la Calvo (1983). As in Gal￿ (2008),
there is a number 1￿￿ of (randomly selected) ￿rms, which sets new prices each
period, with an individual ￿rm￿ s probability of reoptimizing in any given period
being independent of the time elapsed since its last price resetting. Hence, the
parameter ￿ is an index of stickiness. The aggregate price dynamics is described
by the following equation:
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PiR
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where ￿i
t =
P
i
t
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t￿1
is the gross in￿ ation rate and PiR
t is the price set in period t
by ￿rms reoptimizing their price in that period. A ￿rm reoptimizing in period t
chooses a price PiR
t that maximizes the current market value of the pro￿ts ￿i
t,
by solving the following problem:
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subject to the sequence of demand constraints
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is the discount
factor, ￿i
t (￿) is the cost function of the ￿rm, whereas Y i
t+kjt represents output
10in period t + k for a ￿rm resetting its price in period t. Next, the ￿rst order
condition associated with the problem (32) is given by:
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where  i
t+kjt = ￿
0i
t+k
￿
Y i
t+kjt
￿
indicates the nominal marginal cost in period
t + k for a ￿rm resetting its price in period t and M = ￿
￿￿1
9 is the optimal
markup in absence of constraints on the frequency of price adjustment. Note
that in the absence of price rigidities (￿ = 0) the previous condition collapses to
the optimal price setting condition under ￿ exible prices:
PiR
t = M i
tjt (35)
Moreover, in this particular case, by setting si = 1
￿ and substituting this
value and the de￿nition of nominal marginal costs into (35), an optimal market
allocation, that is able to completely eliminate the consequences of monopolistic
competion, can be reached. In fact, if si = 1
￿, expression (35) turns into the
optimality condition of perfect competition, according to which the price should
be equal to the marginal cost.
Then, we divide both the members of (34) by Pi
t￿1 :
1 X
k=0
￿kEt
￿
Qi
t;t+kYt+kjt
￿
PiR
t
Pi
t￿1
￿ M ￿ MCt+kjt￿i
t￿1;t+k
￿￿
= 0 (36)
where MCt+kjt =
 
i
t+kjt
P i
t+k
is the real marginal cost in period t+k for ￿rms whose
last price set is in period t and, ￿nally, we log-linearize the optimal price setting
condition (36) around the zero in￿ ation steady state with a ￿rst-order Taylor
expansion:
piR
t ￿ pi
t￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿￿)
1 X
k=0
(￿￿)
k Et
h
c mc
i
t+kjt +
￿
pi
t+k ￿ pi
t￿1
￿i
(37)
where c mc
i
t+kjt = mci
t+kjt ￿ mc is the logdeviation of marginal cost from its
steady state value.
The optimal price setting strategy for the typical ￿rm resetting its price in
period t can be derived from (37), reducing some algebra:
piR
t = ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿￿)
1 X
k=0
(￿￿)
k Et
h
mci
t+kjt + pi
t+k
i
(38)
with ￿ = log ￿
￿￿1; that represents the optimal markup in the absence of
constraints on the frequency of price adjustment (￿ = 0): Hence, the price set-
ting rule for the ￿rms resetting their prices is represented by a charge over the
9The analitical derivation is reported in the Appendix.
11optimal markup in the presence of fully ￿ exible prices, given by a weighted av-
erage of their current and expected nominal marginal costs, with the weights
being proportional to the probability of the price remaining e⁄ective (￿)
k. In a
zero-in￿ ation steady state equilibrium and in the absence of price stickiness for
all the ￿rms (￿ = 0); the previous expression collapses to:
￿ pi = ￿ + 1 (39)
Note that, under the hypothesis of costant returns to scale, implicit in the
production function of our model, the marginal cost is independent from the
level of production, i.e. mci
t+kjt = mci
t+k and, hence, common across ￿rms; so,
the expression (38) can be rewritten in the following way:
piR
t ￿ pi
t￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿￿)
1 X
k=0
(￿￿)
k Et
￿
mci
t+k
￿
+
1 X
k=0
(￿￿)
k Et
￿
￿i
t+k
￿
(40)
Moreover, the equation (40) can be expressed as the following di⁄erence
expression:
piR
t ￿ pi
t￿1 = ￿￿Et
￿
piR
t+1 ￿ pi
t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿￿) c mc
i
t + ￿i
t (41)
and combined with (31) in a log-linear form in order to obtain the domestic
in￿ ation equation:
￿i
t = ￿Et
￿
￿i
t+1
￿
+
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
c mc
i
t (42)
The previous expression states that the current value of domestic in￿ ation is
positively related to the discounted expected value of the in￿ ation of one period
ahead and to the log-deviation of real marginal cost according to the degree of
price stickiness captured by the parameter ￿:
2.4 Government
Following the same structure of private consumption, country i￿ s public con-
sumption index is given by
Gi
t =
￿Z 1
0
Gi
t (j)
￿￿1
￿ dj
￿ ￿
￿￿1
(43)
where Gi
t (j) represents the quantity of domestic goods purchased by the gov-
ernment. In line with the empirical evidence (Trionfetti, 2000), we assume that
government purchases are fully oriented towards domestic goods. Each govern-
ment chooses optimally the composition of a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator over all
goods produced in its own country to minimize expenditure, yielding a structure
of demand schedules analogous to those of private consumption:
Gi
t(j) =
￿
Pi
t(j)
Pi
t
￿￿￿
Gi
t (44)
12Nevertheless, we want to focus our attention on the allocation of the aggregate
level of primary public expenditure and we assume that out-of-steady-state gov-
ernment consumption is related to its lagged out-of-steady-state level, to the
lagged out-of-steady-state real stock of public debt and to the present out-of-
steady-state output according to the following rule
^ gi
t = ￿^ gi
t￿1 ￿ ￿^ di
R;t￿1 ￿ ￿^ yi
t (45)
where
^ di
R;t￿1 = ^ di
t￿1 ￿ ^ pi
t￿1
indicates the log deviation of real public debt, the parameter ￿ measures
the magnitude of the feedback on debt e⁄ect and the coe¢ cient ￿ indicates the
countercyclicality of public consumption
The rule (45) is not a model-based rule, but it tries to capture both the
phenomenon of debt stabilization, as implicitly required by the SGP criteria,
and the business cycle stabilization, that is an important objective of ￿scal
policy tout court.
The presence of a feedback on debt component in a spending rule has been
also adopted by Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2007); these authors examine the
impact of di⁄erent degrees of feedback on debt for public expenditure in an
economy with nominal rigidities where monetary policy is optimal: using a wel-
fare function, they ￿nd the optimal level of ￿scal feedback, which represents
a threshold above which optimal monetary policy becomes less active and ￿s-
cal feedback does stabilize in￿ ationary shocks, but with a welfare reduction,
whereas, below this cut-o⁄ value, monetary policy becomes strongly passive
with a deterioration in welfare.
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006) use a rule similar to (45) for taxation,
i.e. the out-of-steady-state level of taxation is an increasing function of the
lagged out-of-steady-state level of public liabilities, together with a monetary
rule whereby the change in the nominal interest rate is set as a function of its own
lag, lagged output growth, and lagged deviations of in￿ ation from target. The
authors maximize a welfare function in the presence of these rules and compare
this framework with the Ramsey optimal policy: they ￿nd that interest rate
rules with a positive response to output can lead to signi￿cant welfare losses,
whereas optimal ￿scal policy is passive. The optimal monetary and ￿scal rule
combination is able to attain the same level of welfare as the Ramsey optimal
policy.
Muscatelli et al. (2004), in an empirical evaluation of monetary-￿scal inter-
actions, estimate a New Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium model with the
presence of monetary and ￿scal rules. The former is based on a forward-looking
Taylor rule speci￿cation, whereas the latter is based on a spending rule and
on a taxation rule; both of them are built so that the variables are allowed to
respond to output, to the ratio between the lagged budget de￿cit on GDP and
to a persistence component, as for (45).
Recently, Colciago et al. (2008) in a a two-country New Keynesian DSGE
model, incorporating non Ricardian consumers, to analyse the stabilizing role
13of national ￿scal policies in a currency union, build a spending rule very similar
to (45) with a feedback-on-debt term to explicitly take into account the SGP
criteria on debt.
Our rule on taxation is such that real tax revenues are given by collecting
lump sum taxation, distortionary taxation on labor, on domestic and foreign
dividends and on domestic and foreign interests on bonds:
Ti
R;t =
￿i
t
Pi
t
+￿n￿
Wi
t
Pi
t
￿Ni
t +￿k
"
r￿
t (1 ￿ #)Di
R;t + r￿
t#D
f
R;t +
(1 ￿ ￿)￿i
t
Pi
t
+
￿￿
f
t
P
f
t
#
(46)
Hence, real taxation is increasing in the hours worked and real wages, in
domestic and foreign real stock of public debt and in domestic and foreign
amount of real pro￿ts.
The law of motion of public debt is described by the following equation:
Di
Ri;t￿1 (1 + r￿
t) + Pi
tGi
t ￿ Ti
t = Di
i;t (47)
that states that the stock of public debt in each period is equal to the present
value of the past stock of public debt increased by the primary de￿cit, given by
the di⁄erence between public expenditure and taxation
￿
Pi
tGi
t ￿ Ti
t
￿
:
3 Equilibrium Dynamics
3.1 Aggregate Demand and Supply side
The market clearing conditions for the goods j in country i can be expressed in
the following way:
Y i
t (j) = Ci
i;t(j) +
Z 1
0
C
f
i;t(j)df + Gi
t(j) (48)
The previous relationship states that domestic production of good j can be
allocated to domestic consumption, to foreign consumption (i.e. exports) and
to public consumption. Then, using the de￿nitions of Ci
i;t(j);C
f
i;t(j) and Gi
t(j),
we obtain:
Y i
t (j) =
￿
Pi
t(j)
Pi
t
￿￿￿ "
(1 ￿ m)Pi
c;tCi
t
Pi
t
+ m
Z 1
0
C
f
t
 
P
f
c;t
Pi
t
!
df + Gi
t
#
Y i
t (j) =
￿
Pi
t(j)
Pi
t
￿￿￿ ￿
1
Pi
t
￿
(1 ￿ m)Pi
c;tCi
t + mP￿
t C￿
t
￿
+ Gi
t
￿
(49)
where
C￿
t =
Z 1
0
C
f
t df
14If we plug the previous relationship into (21), we are able to express C￿
t as
a function of the domestic consumption:
Y i
t (j) =
￿
Pi
t(j)
Pi
t
￿￿￿ ￿
1
Pi
t
￿
(1 ￿ m)Pi
c;tCi
t + mCi
tPi
c;t
￿
+ Gi
t
￿
Y i
t (j) =
￿
Pi
t(j)
Pi
t
￿￿￿ "
Pi
c;t
Pi
t
￿
Ci
t
￿
+ Gi
t
#
(50)
Finally, by plugging (50) into the de￿nition of the aggregate output index
for country i; we obtain an expression of the aggregate domestic output:
Y i
t =
"
Pi
c;t
Pi
t
￿
Ci
t
￿
+ Gi
t
#
(51)
The term log
￿
Y i
t ￿ Gi
t
￿
can be expressed in a ￿rst-order Taylor expansion
about the steady state by the next expression10:
log
￿
Y i
t ￿ Gi
t
￿
= log
￿
(1 ￿ {i) ￿ Y i￿
+
1
1 ￿ {
￿
^ yi
t ￿ {i^ gi
t
￿
(52)
where {i =
￿ G
i
￿ Y i is the steady state government spending share.
From (52), rewriting (51) in a log-deviation from the steady state values and
recalling the de￿nition of the out-of-steady-state public expenditure, we are able
to build the demand side of this economy:
^ yi
t =
￿
(1 ￿ {i)
￿
^ ci
t + m
￿
pi
c;t ￿ pi
t
￿￿
+
1
(1 + ￿)
￿
￿^ gi
t￿1 ￿ ￿^ di
R;t￿1
￿￿
(53)
The previous equation establishes that domestic output is positively related
to domestic consumption, to the terms of trade and to the lagged real public
expenditure, whereas output is decreasing in the lagged real stock of public
debt. The negative relationship between domestic output and the lagged real
stock of public debt represents the amount of resources withdrawn from public
consumption in order to reduce the lack of balance in public accounts. Further-
more, the higher is the steady state government spending share, the lower is the
weight of private consumption in the determination of domestic output due to
the crowding out e⁄ect of public expenditure.
To build the supply side of this economy, ￿rst we have to rewrite the dy-
namics of domestic in￿ ation:
￿i
t = ￿Et
￿
￿i
t+1
￿
+
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
c mc
i
t (54)
and recall the de￿nition of marginal cost (in logs):
mci
t = log
￿
1 ￿ si￿
+ wi
t ￿ pi
t ￿ ai
t (55)
10The analitical derivation is reported in the Appendix.
15Then we add and subtract to the right side of (55) the quantity pi
c;t:
mci
t = log
￿
1 ￿ si￿
+
￿
wi
t ￿ pi
c;t
￿
+
￿
pi
c;t ￿ pi
t
￿
￿ ai
t
and combining the resulting expression with the previous results we obtain the
next relationship:
mci
t = log
￿
1 ￿ si￿
+ci
t +￿ni
t ￿log(1 ￿ ￿)￿log(1 ￿ ￿n)+
￿
pi
c;t ￿ pi
t
￿
￿ai
t (56)
Note that, according to (51), the terms of trade
￿
pi
c;t ￿ pi
t
￿
are equal to
log
￿
Y i
t ￿ Gi
t
￿
￿ ci
t, i.e.:
mci
t = log
￿
1 ￿ si￿
+ ￿ni
t ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ log(1 ￿ ￿n) + log
￿
Y i
t ￿ Gi
t
￿
￿ ai
t (57)
The combination of (57) and (52)11 leads to a de￿nition of real marginal cost
expressed in logdeviation from the steady state value:
c mc
i
t =
￿
1
1 ￿ {i
+ ￿
￿
^ yi
t ￿
{i
1 ￿ {i
^ gi
t ￿ (1 + ￿)^ ai
t (58)
Given the level of output, an increase in government spending crowds out do-
mestic consumption and generates a real appreciation: both these pressures
lead to a reduction in real marginal cost, whose dimension is measured by the
parameter {i:
Finally, by plugging (58) into (54), we are able to derive the new Keynesian
Phillips curve for the domestic economy:
￿i
t = ￿Et
￿
￿i
t+1
￿
+
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
￿￿
1
1 ￿ {i
+ ￿
￿
^ yi
t ￿
{i
1 ￿ {i
^ gi
t ￿ (1 + ￿)^ ai
t
￿
(59)
and, by integrating (59) over i￿[0;1], we are able to obtain the corresponding
new Keynesian Phillips curve for the union as a whole:
￿￿
t = ￿Et
￿
￿￿
t+1
￿
+
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
￿￿
1
1 ￿ {i
+ ￿
￿
^ y￿
t ￿
{i
1 ￿ {i
^ g￿
t ￿ (1 + ￿)^ a￿
t
￿
(60)
where
Y ￿
t = C￿
t + G￿
t (61)
a￿
t =
Z 1
0
ai
tdt (62)
and all the other union-wide variables are de￿ned in a symmetric way with
respect to the country-speci￿c one.
11For this result we use the property that in a symmetric steady state the steady state value
of the terms of trade is equal to one and so ￿ pi
c ￿ ￿ pi = 0
163.2 The E¢ cient Allocation under Flexible Prices
Before describing the dynamic equilibrium conditions in the presence of nominal
rigidities, we need to derive an expression for the ￿ exible-price output Y in
t , i.e.
the natural level of output, in order to de￿ne a measure of the output-gap of
each member￿ s economy and then the one of the whole monetary union. Note
that, due to the presence of distortionary taxation, the only way to calculate the
natural level of output is the solution of the decentralized economy under ￿ exible
prices, because in this case, the equilibrium derived by the solution of the social
planner￿ s problem would not be supported in the decentralized context, as done
by Gal￿ and Monacelli (2008). In the absence of constraints on the frequency of
price adjustment, the price setting rule follows the equation (35), i.e. each ￿rm
charges the price as a markup over the nominal marginal cost and the value of
markup is optimal and equal to M = ￿
￿￿1 and mc = log
￿￿￿1
￿
￿
: The procedure
followed to characterize and derive the fully ￿ exible price output Y in
t is given
by the solution of the decentralized economy, as before, with a null value for the
price-stickiness parameter ￿, i.e.:
mci = log
￿
1 ￿ si￿
+￿ni
t ￿log(1 ￿ ￿)￿log(1 ￿ ￿n)+log
￿
Y in
t ￿ Gi
t
￿
￿ai
t (63)
If we express the previous expression in log-deviation from the steady state
values, we obtain:
0 =
￿
1
1 ￿ {i
+ ￿
￿
b yin
t ￿
{i
1 ￿ {i
b gi
t ￿ (1 + ￿)b ai
t (64)
Finally, the closed solution for the fully ￿ exible prices output for country i
and for the currency union are given by:
b yin
t =
￿
{i
1￿{ib gi
t + (1 + ￿)b ai
t
￿
￿
1
1￿{i + ￿
￿
b y￿n
t =
￿
{i
1￿{ib g￿
t + (1 + ￿)b a￿
t
￿
￿
1
1￿{i + ￿
￿
Subtracting (64) from (58) obtains
c mc
i
t =
￿
1
1 ￿ {i
+ ￿
￿
~ yin
t (65)
and similarly for the currency union:
c mc
i
t =
￿
1
1 ￿ {i
+ ￿
￿
~ y￿n
t (66)
where ~ yi
t = yi
t ￿ yin
t and ~ y￿
t = yi
t ￿ y￿n
t are respectively the de￿nitions of
domestic output gap and union-wide output gap.
The previous relationships state that the log-deviation of real marginal cost
from the steady state is proportional to the log-deviation of output from its
natural level, i.e. the output gap.
173.3 Calibration
Before describing the equilibrium behavior of the prototype member economy
under the framework illustrated above, we need to give a numerical value to the
parameters. To this purpose we distinguish two kinds of parameters: general pa-
rameters and ￿scal policy parameters. The former (m;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿; ￿ r￿;￿;￿;#)
are calibrated according to the benchmark parametrization adopted by Gal￿ and
Monacelli (2008) and some stylized facts about EMU countries, whereas for the
latter we use the EMU data (￿;￿;￿n;￿k). The following table summarizes the
benchmark parametrization for general parameters:
Table 1 : Calibration for general parameters
Parameter Value
m 0:4
￿ 0:99
￿ 3:0
￿ 6:0
￿ 0:25
￿ 0:95
￿￿ 1:7
￿y 0:125
￿ r￿ 0:04
￿ 0:75
￿ 0:50
# 0:56
The values calibrated for the labor supply elasticity (￿), for the elasticity
of substitution between di⁄erentiated goods (￿), for the degree of stickiness of
prices (￿); for the average share of public consumption (￿) for EMU countries,
for the subjective discount factor (￿), which is in line with the real business cycle
literature and implies the steady state value for interest rate (￿ r), ensure a stable
solution to the model. Moreover, following the real business cycle literature
(King and Rebelo (1999)), we suppose a high value for the persistence coe¢ cient
of total labor productivity (￿). Finally, the index of openness with respect to
EMU countries (m); the share of domestic debt held by domestic households
(1 ￿ #) and the fraction of domestic ￿rms held by the residents (1 ￿ ￿) are set
to a value able to match statistical data about Euro-area balance of payments
(source: IMF statistical data (sample 1995-2005)). Monetary policy parameters
(￿ r;￿) are consistent with the empirical literature about Taylor rule in the EMU
(Smets and Wouters (2003)) and are in line with the Taylor principle (￿￿ > 1):
In the next table we calibrate ￿scal policy parameters:
18Table 2 : Calibration for ￿scal policy parameters
Parameter Value
￿n 0:35
￿k 0:24
￿ 0:85
￿ 0:51
￿ 0:20
Tax rate on labor (￿n) is set equal to the average annual implicit tax rate on
labor employed (0.35) for the Euro area, tax rate on dividends (￿k) is set equal to
the average implicit tax rate on capital income (0.24) for the Euro area, whereas
the persistence coe¢ cient in public expenditure (￿) is set equal to the average
elasticity of real public expenditure with respect to its lagged value (0.85) for
the Euro area (source: Eurostat statistical data (sample 1995-2005)). At the
same time, we let the feedback on debt parameter (￿) assume a value equal
to the average elasticity of real public expenditure with respect to lagged real
stock of public debt for the Euro area (0.20) and the countercyclical parameter
(￿) take a value equal to the elasticity of real public expenditure with respect
to output (0.51) (source: Eurostat statistical data (sample 1995-2005)). In the
next section we discuss the dynamic behavior of the model both in the presence
of a technology shock and of a union-wide interest rate shock under the policy
rules described above.
4 Dynamic simulations under the policy rules
In this section we discuss the dynamic equilibrium behavior of a representative
member economy under the model discussed above, by resorting to a series
of dynamic simulations with the parameterization described in the previous
section. In particular, we focus our attention on the responses of ￿scal policy
instruments (public expenditure, tax revenues, public debt and the ratio public
debt/GDP) to the domestic shock, i.e. the technology shock, and to the union-
wide shock, i.e. interest rate shock.
The ￿rst set of ￿gures (Section 7.4.1.) displays the dynamic response of out-
put, output gap, real public debt, the ratio debt/GDP, total private consump-
tion, real public expenditure, hours worked, real wages, real marginal costs, real
tax revenues and real pro￿ts in the presence of a technology shock. The rigidity
in aggregate demand resulting from the stickiness of the domestic price level
leads technology shock (that in this framework is a labor productivity shock) to
generate a negative comovement between hours worked and productivity. This
result is also supported by strong empirical evidence (Gal￿ (1999), Francis and
Remy (2005); Christinano et al. (2003) among others). The intuition for this
result is straightforward. When a technology shock hits the economy, the in-
crease in productivity determines a fall in real marginal costs, domestic prices
decrease, as a consequence of a right-shift in the aggregate supply curve and
following the decrease in real marginal costs. Aggregate demand and private
19consumption increase, due to the fall in domestic prices. Nevertheless, aggre-
gate demand and prices, given the nominal rigidities, for which only a fraction
1 ￿ ￿ of ￿rms reset their prices, change less than under fully ￿ exible prices.
Aggregate output increases, but less than in the absence of price rigidities: for
this reason, a contraction in the output gap occurs. Furthermore, because la-
bor is more productive with a consequent increase in the real wages, the ￿rms
will require less labor input. As a consequence, output does not increase in
the same proportion of the productivity shock. On the other hand, real prof-
its increase due both to the positive shift of output and to the contraction in
real marginal costs. Real tax revenues are procyclical, i.e. with the calibra-
tion adopted they increase whenever output does the same. On the contrary,
public debt is countercyclical, that is, every time a positive productivity shock
hits the economy and shifts upwards domestic output, government debt shows
a negative deviation from its steady state value: an increase in output, leading
to an increase in real tax revenues, with a countercyclical public consumption,
generates a countercyclical movement of the stock of public debt. In this way,
the ratio debt/GDP decreases for some periods, due to the contemporaneous
contraction of the real stock of public debt and the increase in output, and then
reverts to the original steady state value. Thus, public expenditure, together
with taxation, plays the role of a "smoother" for output cyclical ￿ uctuations.
The second set of ￿gures (Section 7.4.2.) displays the dynamic response of
the same variables in the presence of a positive shock on the nominal interest
rate. An increase in the union-wide interest rate determines a reduction in the
rate of in￿ ation and so in the level of prices (union-wide prices and domestic
prices). The decrease in the price consumer index pushes up real wages and, at
the same time, real marginal costs, that, with an invariant level of output and
productivity, cause a contraction in labor demand and hence in hours worked.
The reduction in labor input generates, as a consequence, a fall in output, in
pro￿ts and in real tax revenues. Private consumption and output decrease less
than under fully ￿ exible prices due to the stickiness in prices; for this reason
and because of the increase in real marginal cost, an increase in the output
gap occurs. Real public debt con￿rms its countercyclicality as in the case of
technology shock, i.e. in this case it goes up when output falls. Indeed, in
this context the upper pressure of real public is strongly determined by the
increase in the interest rate. In this case, the ratio debt/GDP increases for
some periods, due to an expansion of the real stock of public debt and to a
contraction in output, and then reverts to the original steady state value.
Hence, also in the presence of a union-wide monetary policy shock ￿scal pol-
icy is able to stabilize output cyclical ￿ uctuations through a procyclical taxation
and a countercyclical public expenditure.
5 A Welfare Analysis
This section aims to evaluate ￿scal and monetary rules￿performances, basing
on a welfare-criterion referred to country i and relying on a second-order ap-
20proximation to the utility losses of the consumers. In order to measure these
utility losses, we make use of a welfare function de￿ned here as the discounted
sum of the utilities across households:
z ￿
1 X
t=0
￿tU
￿
Ci
t;Ni
t;Gi
t
￿
(67)
The benchmark values against which we measure the welfare losses associ-
ated to our policy rules are referred to an economic framework without dis-
tortionary taxation, with zero stock of public debt, with lump-sum taxation
able to ￿nance public consumption at its optimal level and without monetary
rules. In such an environment, output gap is measured as the di⁄erence be-
tween actual output and the fully ￿ exible price one, with the latter also optimal
from the social planner￿ s point of view, due to the absence of distortionary tax-
ation. For this purpose12, we have to impose for each variable a steady state
value corresponding to the one deriving from the solution of the Social Planner￿ s
problem13.
As already shown in Gal￿ and Monacelli (2008) a second order approximation
to (67) can be rewritten as the average utility losses of union households resulting
from ￿ uctuations about the e¢ cient steady state in the following functional
form14:
￿ ’
1
2
1 X
t=0
￿t
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿i
t
￿2
+ (1 + ￿)
￿
~ yi
t
￿2
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
~ fi
t
￿2￿
+ tips (68)
where tips denotes terms that are independent of policy and ~ fi
t =
￿
gi
t ￿ yi
t
￿
￿
log￿ de￿ned as ￿scal gap. In words, this variable represents the share of output
used for public consumption less the amount of public expenditure to which the
households give a weight in the utility function (log￿) and for this reason it
represents an ine¢ cient gap.
Taking the expected value on both side of (68) at time 0 obtains the average
welfare loss per period given by the following linear combination of output gap
and in￿ ation variances and the variance of ￿scal gap:
L =
1
2
￿
￿
￿
var
￿
￿i
t
￿
+ (1 + ￿)var
￿
~ yi
t
￿
+
￿
1 ￿ ￿
var
￿
~ fi
t
￿￿
(69)
Using (69), given the monetary and ￿scal rules together with a calibration
for the model￿ s parameters above described, it￿ s possible to compute the second
order moments of the simulated time series15 for output gap, in￿ ation and ￿scal
gap, in order to derive the corresponding welfare losses associated to these rules.
12For this point we thank in particular Pierpaolo Benigno for his important suggestions.
13These values, calculated by Gal￿ and Monacelli (2008), are reported in Appendix.
14For the analytical derivation of the welfare function, see Appendix in Gal￿ and Monacelli
(2008).
15The time series generated by the simulation process are HP-￿ltred.
21Table 3 reports the measures of domestic in￿ ation, output gap and ￿scal
gap variance together with the per cent contributions to welfare losses in round
brackets: in column "A" we analyse the e⁄ects of the only presence of Taylor rule
(26) with lump-sum taxation able to ￿nance public consumption at its optimal
level and zero public debt, in column "B" we show the e⁄ects of ￿scal rules (45
and 46) with no rules for monetary policy, whereas column "C" evaluates the
joint e⁄ects of the monetary and ￿scal rules.
Table 3 : Contributions to Welfare Losses
Taylor Rule (A) Fiscal Rules (B) Taylor Rule + Fiscal Rules (C)
1
2
￿
￿var
￿
￿i
t
￿
0:18(28:57%) 0:87(91:58%) 0:01(25%)
1
2 (1 + ￿)var
￿
~ yi
t
￿
0:20(31:75%) 0:05(5:26%) 0:02(50%)
1
2var
￿
~ fi
t
￿
0:25(39:68%) 0:03(3:16%) 0:01(25%)
Total 0:63 0:95 0:04
From a ￿rst inspection of the table, it￿ s evident how the mix of ￿scal and
monetary rules (Column C) reduces welfare losses more than the single rules
and so it should be preferred. The comparison between ￿scal rules and mone-
tary rule shows that ￿scal rules generate larger welfare losses than Taylor rule.
Furthermore from an analysis of Column A and B it emerges that Taylor rule is
able to better reduce the ￿ uctuations in domestic in￿ ation in comparison with
￿scal rules, whereas both output gap and ￿scal gap show smaller variations in
the presence of ￿scal rules than under Taylor rule. Finally, under the monetary
rule, ￿scal gap has the most important role in explaining welfare losses whereas
under ￿scal rules, this role belongs to domestic in￿ ation.
From this picture two key results emerge: 1) the combination of a monetary
policy, that positively responds to in￿ ation and output gap, and ￿scal rules
made up of distortionary taxation on labor, dividends and interests on public
bonds and of a countercyclical and debt-stabilizing public consumption is wel-
fare improving than the same ￿scal and monetary rules singly considered; 2) in
the presence of our monetary rule domestic in￿ ation variance falls more than in
the presence of ￿scal rules, whereas output and ￿scal gap ￿ uctuations are better
smoothed by our ￿scal rules on public expenditure and taxation. Therefore, in
a currency union scenario like the EMU, the common monetary policy should
mainly focus on in￿ ation stabilization, whereas ￿scal policy, institutionally de-
centralized at a country level, should centre on output gap stabilization. This
last objective can be reached in the presence of ￿scal rules focused not only on
business cycle stabilization but also on debt stabilization, consistently with the
SGP.
These ￿ndings have some similarities with those of Ferrero (2005). He ￿nds
that, in the presence of a monetary rule that positively reacts to in￿ ation and
output gap and with a ￿scal constraint on real debt such that it positively
reacts to output gap, such ￿scal policy leads to welfare gains if compared to
22balanced budget rules, whereas monetary policy better smoothes in￿ ation and
hence should focus on price stability.
6 Conclusions
This paper develops a New-Keynesian multicountry model applied to the EMU
context with sticky prices and the presence of policy rules related to ￿scal pol-
icy and monetary policy. The former is managed by the governement sector,
institutionally decentralized at a single country level, that makes use of distor-
tionary taxation on labor, on dividends and interests on public bonds and of
public consumption following a countercyclical and debt-stabilizing behavior.
The latter is under the control of the common monetary authority, that follows
a Taylor rule increased by a stochastic component driven by a monetary shock.
From a welfare analysis of the policy rules we have the chance to evaluate
the welfare contribution, in terms of welfare losses, of the monetary rule in a
scenario without public debt and with lump-sum taxation able to ￿nance public
consumption at its optimal level, of the ￿scal rules in a context without any
monetary rules and of the combination of ￿scal rules and monetary rules.
The results obtained show that i) in the presence of our monetary rule alone,
domestic in￿ ation ￿ uctuations are better smoothed than in the presence of our
￿scal rules; ii) output gap variance is smaller in the presence of ￿scal rules alone
than whenever only the monetary rule is present; iii) the ￿scal-monetary policy
mix made up of our rules is able to lower welfare losses more than the monetary
and ￿scal rules in isolation.
The policy implications of these results are that i) in a currency union, like
the EMU, monetary policy should have the objective of in￿ ation stabilization, as
institutionally indicated in the Maastricht Treaty; ii) ￿scal policy should centre
on output gap stabilization. This aim can be pursued in the presence of ￿scal
rules not only oriented to business cycle stabilization, that is one of the purposes
assigned to ￿scal policy by the theory of public ￿nance (Musgrave (1959)), but
also to debt stabilization, as prescripted by the SGP.
The theoretical structure described above calls for further analysis on several
points. The model ignores capital accumulation and stickiness is only con￿ned to
prices and not to wages. Furthermore, it could be useful to make a distinction in
the government expenditure rule between current public expenditure and capital
public expenditure, in order to de￿ne di⁄erent behaviors of these components.
We plan to further examine some of these points in a future work.
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257 Appendix
7.1 Pro￿t maximization problem in steady state
Max
￿ Y i(j)
" ￿￿ Y i(j)
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￿
￿
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(71)
The expressiom (70) states that, in steady state, the level of price ￿ Pi given
by the product of marginal costs
￿
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i
￿ Ai
￿
and markup
￿
￿
￿￿1
￿
:
7.2 Taylor expansion of log(Y i
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t)
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t = log
Y
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267.3 The e¢ cient steady-state derived by the solution of
Central Planner￿ s problem
The symmetric steady state implied by the solution of the Social Planner￿ s
problem is the same as the one of Gal￿ and Monacelli (2008). In this context
taxation takes the only form of lump-sum taxes and public debt is absent:
￿ Ni = 1 (72)
￿ Y i = ￿ Ai (73)
￿ Ci
i = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ m) ￿ Ai (74)
￿ C
f
i = (1 ￿ ￿)m ￿ Ai (75)
￿ Gi = ￿ ￿ Ai (76)
￿ Ci = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿ Ai￿1￿m ￿ ￿ A￿￿m
(77)
￿ Y ￿ = ￿ A￿ (78)
￿ C￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿ A￿￿
(79)
￿ G￿ = ￿ ￿ A￿ (80)
The previous conditions are supported as a fully ￿ exible prices equilibrium
at a decentralized level with the subsidy being equal to 1
￿, that is the value
able to completely o⁄set the market distortions deriving by the monopolistic
competition. Moreover, the e¢ cient allocations of the terms of trade is given
by:
￿ ￿ Pi
c
￿ Pi
￿m
=
￿ ￿ Ci
￿ C￿
￿ 1
1￿m
=
￿ Ai
￿ A￿
All these conditions with the time subscript represent the Social Planner￿ s
dynamic equilibrium used as a benchmark to evaluate the policy rules.
277.4 Figures
7.4.1 Impulse response functions to a shock in technology
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337.4.2 Impulse response functions to a shock in Taylor rule
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